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COMMENTARY
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
AND THE U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION'S "MANDATORY GUIDELINES"
Michael Tonry*

Were elected public officials more interested in
rational policymaking than in political posturing, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission report, "Mandatory
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System," would lead the Bush Administration to
withdraw all mandatory sentencing proposals and
the Congress to repeal mandatories now in effect.
The Commission's report convincingly demonstrates that mandatory minimum sentencing laws
shift discretion from judges to prosecutors, result in
higher trial rates and case processing times, arbitrarily fail to acknowledge salient differences between
cases, and often punish minor offenders much more
harshly than anyone involved believes warranted.
Interviews with judges, lawyers, and probation
officers at twelve sites showed that heavy majorities
of judges, defense counsel, and probation officers
dislike mandatory penalties; prosecutors were about
evenly divided. Finally, and perhaps not surprisingly given the other findings, the report shows that
judges and lawyers not uncommonly circumvent
mandatories.
Three striking features of the report stand out.
First, the Commission's is the most ambitious and
sophisticated study of mandatory sentencing ever
undertaken. Second, its core findings are entirely
consistent with the findings of earlier empirical
research. Third, nearly all the criticisms of mandatory penalties that the Commission offers apply with
equal force to the Commission's own guidelines.
The Commission's arguments for abandonment
of Federal mandatory penalties, if applied to the
Federal sentencing guidelines, suggest that the
guidelines themselves should be abandoned or
overhauled. The fundamental defect of mandatory
penalties, the cause of all the operational problems
the Commission documents, is that they are mandatory. The Federal sentencing guidelines by contrast
were intended to be presumptive, not mandatory. In
practice, as the Commission works ever harder to
limit judges' departures from the guidelines,, they
become more and more like mandatory sentencing
laws. Indeed, in what is either a Freudian slip, or a
deliberate effort by an unknown Commission staffer
to emphasize the similarity between mandatory
penalties and the Federal guidelines, the report's
executive summary refers to "the mandatory guidelines that the Sentencing Commission would promulgate" (emphasis added).
* Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University
of Minnesota.

This article offers a brief overview of the Commission's mandatory sentencing report. Part I
describes the research on which the report is based
and summarizes key findings. Part II compares the
Commission's findings to the findings of previous
research on mandatory minimums. Part III considers
whether the credibility of the guidelines the Commission itself developed and promulgated is fatally
undermined by the Commission's analyses of the
shortcomings of mandatory minimum penalties.
I. What the Commission Did and
What It Learned
The Commission's study was prompted by a
congressional mandate. 2 The congressional charge
had eight parts, including an assessment of the
effects of mandatories on sentencing disparities, a
description of the interaction between mandatories
and plea bargaining, a compilation of all mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions in Federal law, and
"a detailed empirical research study of the effect of
mandatory minimum penalties in the Federal
system." The Commission was also directed to
consider the interactions between mandatories and
sentencing guidelines, the effects of mandatories on
Federal prison populations, and various ways that
Congress "can express itself with respect to sentencing policy."
To address these subjects, the Commission
examined pending legislation and existing mandatory sentencing laws and their legislative histories,
examined the rationales for such laws and for the
legislation creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
and undertook five major projects analyzing, or
collecting and analyzing, empirical data.
The empirical analyses are the heart of the Commission's report, so I do not devote much space here
to the statutory and conceptual analyses. Concerning
existing statutes, the Commission determined that
there are approximately 100 separate Federal
mandatory minimum penalty provisions in 60
different criminal statutes. More than half of those
statutes were not used between 1984 and 1990. Four
statutes accounted for 94 percent of the 59,780 cases
sentenced under mandatory provisions during those
years. Concerning conceptual analyses, the Commission argued that the existing Federal guidelines were
a better vehicle than mandatory penalties for setting
Federal sentencing policies and that Congress has
other, better ways to influence Federal sentencing
practice than by passing mandatory sentencing laws.
Before I describe the Commission's empirical
findings, a few prefatory words should be said about
the study. The Commission's research staff deserve
high marks for a first-rate piece of research. The
research design is among the best imaginable for
investigating charging, bargaining, and sentencing
patterns. The combination of quantitative analyses of
1984-1990 sentencing patterns, a detailed quantitative
analysis of case processing in 1990, and various
interviews and surveys provide complementary
sources of information. In presenting and discussing
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findings, the report carefully notes the limits of the
claims it can make and describes alternative interpretations of findings. For years to come, this study will
likely be the standard against which other analyses of
mandatory sentencing are judged.
The Commission analyzed three data sets
describing Federal sentencing and two sources of
data concerning the opinions of judges, assistant U.S.
attorneys, and others. The three sentencing data sets
were FPSSIS, 3 Sentencing Commission monitoring
data for fiscal year 1990, and a 12.5 percent random
sample from the Sentencing Commission's file of
defendants sentenced in fiscal year 1990. 4 Data for
the random sample were augmented by examining
computerized and case files to identify cases (there
proved to be 1165 defendants) in which "actual
offense behavior" met statutory criteria for receipt of
a mandatory minimum drug or weapon sentence.
The two sources of data on practitioners' opinions
were structured interviews in 12 judicial districts of
234 practitioners (48 judges, 72 assistant U.S. attorneys, 48 defense attorneys, 66 probation officers), and
a May 1991 mail survey of 2998 practitioners (the
same groups as were interviewed; 1261 had responded by the time the report was written).
A. Results of the Sentencing Analyses
The sentencing data revealed a number of patterns
that the Commission found disturbing. First, there
were clear indications that prosecutors often do not
file charges that carry mandatory minimums when
the evidence would have supported such charges.
For one example, prosecutors failed to file charges
for mandatory weapons enhancements against 45
percent of drug defendants for whom they would
have been appropriate. For another, prosecutors
failed to seek mandatory sentencing enhancements
for prior felony convictions in 63 percent of cases in
-which they could have been filed. For a third,
defendants were charged with the highest applicable
mandatory-minimum offense in only 74 percent of
cases.
Second, there were clear indications that prosecutors used the mandatory provisions tactically to
induce guilty pleas. For one example, among
defendants who were fully charged with applicable
mandatory sentence charges who were convicted at
trial, 96 percent received the full mandatory minimum sentence; by contrast, 27 percent of those who
pled guilty pled to charges bearing no mandatory
minimum or a lower one. For another example, of
all defendants who pled guilty (whether or not
initially charged with all the applicable mandatorybearing charges), 32 percent had no mandatory
minimum at conviction, and 53 percent were sentenced below the minimum that the evidence would
have justified.' For a third example, among those
defendants against whom mandatory weapons
enhancements were filed, the weapons charges were
later dismissed in 26 percent of cases.
Third, mandatories increased trial rates, and
presumably also increased workloads and case

processing times. Nearly 30 percent of those convicted of offenses bearing mandatory minimums
were convicted at trial, a rate two and one half times
the overall trial rate for federal criminal defendants.
Fourth, there were indications that judges (presumably with the assent of prosecutors) often
imposed sentences less severe than applicable mandatory provisions would appear to require. Before
examples are given, it bears mention that the Sentencing Commission's "modified real offense" policies direct judges, especially in drug cases, to sentence on the basis of actual offense behavior, and not
simply the offense of conviction.
Here are a couple of the Commission's findings
that suggest judicial willingness to work around,
and under, the mandatories. Forty percent of all
defendants whose cases the Commission believed
warranted specific mandatory minimums received
shorter sentences than the applicable statutes
specified. Another example: mandatory minimum
defendants received downward departures 22
percent of the time. The Commission observes that
this could result from an unusually high prevalence
of substantial assistance motions or "alternatively,
the increased departure rate may reflect a greater
tendency to exercise prosecutorial or judicial
6
discretion as the severity of the penalties increases.
Fifth, perhaps in part because of the patterns revealed in the four preceding points, the Commission
concluded that substantial unwarranted disparities
existed in sentencing of defendants to whom
mandatory minimums applied. There appeared to
be substantial differences among circuits: in the
District of Columbia, First, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, more than 70 percent of mandatory
minimum defendants received sentences at or above
the levels the Commission believed appropriate. By
contrast, fewer than half of defendants received such
sentences in the Second and Tenth Circuits and only
a bit more than half (50.8 percent) in the Ninth.
There were other indications of disparity. The
Commission notes that "the disparate application of
mandatory minimum sentences in cases in which
available data strongly suggest that a mandatory
minimum is applicable appears to be related to the
race of the defendant, where whites [46 percent] are
more likely than non-whites [blacks, 32 percent;
Hispanics, 43 percent] to be sentenced below the
applicable mandatory minimum."7 The Commission also observed that, by its definition, disparities
exist among like situated defendants when 40
percent of offenders to whom particular mandatories
should apply receive less severe sentences.
Taken together, these empirical findings suggested
to the Commission that mandatory minimums are
not working. They are shifting too much discretion
to the prosecutor. They are apparently (the Commission never comes right out and says this, though
it several times implies it 8 ) provoking judges and
prosecutors willfully to circumvent their application.
They are producing high trial rates and unacceptable
sentencing disparities. Finally, on the basis of
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sheerest speculation, the Commission suggests that
less than uniform application of the mandatories "is
likely to thwart the deterrent value of mandatory
minimums."9
B. Results of the Opinion Surveys
The results of the interviews of federal court practitioners about the impact of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws are easy to report. In one-hour
structured interviews, 38 of 48 Federal district court
judges offered unfavorable comments. The most
common were that the mandatory sentences are too
harsh and that they eliminate judicial discretion.
Among 48 defense counsel, only one had anything
positive to say about mandatories and he also had
negative comments. The most common complaints
were that the mandatories are too harsh, that they
result in too many trials, and that they eliminate
judicial discretion. Probation officers were also
overwhelmingly hostile to the mandatories; their
most common complaints were that the mandatories
are too harsh, result in prison overcrowding, and
eliminate judicial discretion. Only among prosecutors was sentiment more favorable to mandatories
and even then 34 of 61 interviewed who expressed a
judgment were wholly (23) or partially (11) negative.
Consistently with the interview data, the mail
survey showed that 62 percent of judges, 52 percent
of private counsel, and 89 percent of Federal Defenders want mandatories for drug crimes eliminated,
compared to only 10 percent of prosecutors and 22
percent of probation officers.
II. How the Commission's Findings
Compare with Earlier Research
The Commission's findings gain credibility from
their remarkable consistency with the findings of
prior research on mandatory sentencing and plea
bargaining "bans." Evaluations of plea bargaining
bans show that lawyers and judges who think them
unreasonable often find ways to circumvent them.
Major evaluations of the operation of mandatory
sentencing laws for drug or firearms offenses or both
have been carried out in Florida, Massachusetts,
Michigan, and New York. Perhaps the most exhaustive examination of mandatory sentencing laws
before the Commission's work was an evaluation of
the later-repealed Rockefeller Drug Laws in New
York. All of these studies, and a few others, were
examined and synthesized by the National Academy
of Sciences Panel on Sentencing Research. 10
Earlier research on mandatory sentencing laws
showed that such laws often led to increased rates of
early dismissal of cases. Such laws often led to
prosecutorial and judicial circumvention of the
mandatory sentencing laws, especially when the
mandated sentences were harsher than judges and
lawyers believed to be just. Prosecutors often used
the mandatories as plea bargaining chits and permitted defendants to plead guilty to other offenses not
subject to mandatory penalties. Sometimes judges
simply failed to find, as a matter of fact, that the

necessary elements of the mandatory offense had
been proved.
Mandatory sentencing laws often led, especially
dramatically in the case of the Rockefeller Drug
Laws, to increased trial rates and increased average
case processing times. And, in some cases that did
not benefit from early dismissals, opportune plea
bargains, or judges' failures to find seemingly
unchallenged facts, some defendants were sentenced
to punishments more severe than judges and lawyers
believe to be just.
Now consider the Commission's findings. Like
the earlier research, the Commission detected
prosecutorial and judicial behavior that appeared to
be inconsistent with unflinching application of the
mandatories. Like the earlier research, the Commission observed increased trial rates for cases subject'to
mandatories. And, in the interviews and mail
survey, as in earlier research, the Commission
learned that many practitioners strongly dislike
mandatory sentencing laws.
It all fits together. If the vast majority of trial
judges and defense counsel, and many prosecutors,
believe mandatory penalties to be too rigid and too
harsh, it should be no surprise that prosecutors often
do not file the most serious possible charge, that
counsel negotiate pleas that escape some or all of the
mandatories' force, and that judges find grounds for
reducing sentences.
For legislators, much of their purpose in supporting mandatory sentencing laws is achieved when the
vote is cast. They have been seen to be tough on
crime. For judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel,
it is another story. They must live with their own
consciences and with their shared views of the
bounds of fair treatment of offenders. They must
also keep the courts functioning. That they sometimes devise ways to avoid application of laws that
they believe to be unreasonably harsh should come
as no surprise. This is what earlier research on
mandatory sentencing laws has shown, and the Commission's findings demonstrate that history is being
repeated.
III. What Does the Mandatory Sentencing
Report Imply About the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines?
The Commission draws substantially different
conclusions from its mandatory sentencing study
than I do, or than I suspect most independent
analysts will. The Commission documents the
defects of harsh mandatory sentencing laws and
explains that the Federal sentencing guidelines can
achieve all the aims of mandatory penalties better
than mandatory penalties do, while avoiding their
foreseeable defects. Independent analysts will, I
suspect, conclude that most of the critical allegations
in the Commission's indictment of mandatory
sentencing laws apply with equal force to the Federal
sentencing guidelines, and that the Commission
would be well-advised to reconsider key features of
the guidelines.
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As was revealed, purposely or inadvertently,
when the Commission's report referred to its own
sentencing guidelines as "mandatory," most of the
Commission's critique of mandatory penalties
applies with equal force to its own guidelines. A
court could probably appropriately take judicial
notice of the widespread hostility of Federal district
court judges to the Federal sentencing guidelines.
The grounds of that hostility are the same as the
grounds the Commission reports for judicial opposition to mandatories-that they are too harsh and too
rigid and unduly constrain judicial discretion.
Except for a preliminary evaluation of plea
bargaining under the guidelines before Mistretta was
decided," no published evaluations of case processing under the Federal sentencing guidelines are now
available. One might reasonably predict, however,
that such an evaluation will show charging, plea
bargaining, charge dismissal, and sentencing patterns
not greatly different from those the Commission
describes for mandatory sentencing.
The Commission's findings concerning mandatory
penalties, based on research, closely parallel the Federal Courts Study Committee's observations concerning the Federal guidelines, based on testimony. The
Study Committee questioned the "impersonal and
mechanistic character of the guidelines approach."
Ninety percent of district judges surveyed said that
guidelines make sentencing more time consuming.
The Committee received testimony "again and
again" that guidelines were unduly rigid and made it
difficult for judges to impose just sentences. The
Committee was told of "hidden bargaining" and
"that the rigidity of the guidelines is causing a
massive, though unintended, transfer of discretion
12
and authority from the court to the prosecutor."
The Sentencing Commission itself, in its criticism
of mandatory penalties makes five basic points:
1. "mandatory minimums transfer sentencing
power from the court to the prosecutor" (p. iii);
2. "under mandatory minimums, offenders
seemingly not similar nonetheless receive similar
sentences" (p. ii);
3. "since the charging and plea bargaining processes are neither open to public review nor generally
reviewable by the courts, the honesty and truth in
sentencing intended by the guidelines system is
compromised" (p. ii);
4. "the disparate application of mandatory
minimum sentences ...appears to be related to the
race of the defendant, where whites are more likely
than non-whites to be sentenced below the applicable
mandatory minimum" (p. ii);
5. "lack of uniform application [of mandatories]
creates unwarranted disparity in sentencing, and
compromises the potential of the guidelines sentencing system to reduce disparity." (p. ii).
Under the existing Federal sentencing guidelines,
the first four of those points are likely to apply to the
guidelines nearly as much as they do to the mandatory penalties.
The fifth point is the crux of the problem.

Although the Commission objects to "disparities"
resulting from judicial and prosecutorial circumventions of the rigidity of mandatories, many trial
judges object equally vigorously to the rigidity of the
Commission's guidelines.
Everything we know from the Commission's
mandatory penalty study, from other research on
mandatories, and from research on sentencing
guidelines tells us that judges and prosecutors will,
much of the time, find ways to circumvent sentencing laws they regard as unjust or unduly harsh. The
disparities the Commission decries under mandatories are a foreseeable and inevitable by-product of
the Commission's harsh and mechanical guidelines.
A Commission-sponsored assessment of plea
bargaining under the guidelines, conducted by
University of Chicago Law Professor Stephen
Schulhofer and U.S. Sentencing Commission
member Ilene Nagel, contains numerous illustrations
of assistant U.S. attorneys making charging or bargaining decisions in order to avoid imposition of
guideline sentences that the prosecutor believed to
be unjustly severe. This is curious because it shows
that the Commission fully understands that its own
guidelines raise problems similar to those it disapproves concerning mandatory sentencing laws. For
example: "charge bargain[ing's] . . . potential for
introducing disparity is likewise substantial";
"prosecutors viewed some guidelines sentences as
too severe. They granted sentencing concessions not
because they were obligated to do so in this bargaining situation,
but because of their own sense of the
3
equities."
For reasons best known to the members of the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Commission has
tried to make the Federal sentencing guidelines
nearly as mandatory as Federal mandatory sentencing laws. Every other sentencing commission has
adhered to its statutory charge to develop presumptive sentencing guidelines that allow judges and
counsel openly and honestly to adjust sentences to
accommodate meaningful differences among cases.
There is no reason to predict that the U.S.
Sentencing Commission will have a change of heart
about the purposes and wisdom of its self-styled
"mandatory guidelines." If it does not, however, as
its analysis of mandatory minimums shows, the
sentencing guidelines are likely to continue to meet
with judicial hostility, prosecutorial ambivalence,
and wholesale circumvention.

FOOTNOTES
1

Statement of Hon. Vincent L. Broderick and Hon. Mark
Wolf, March 5, 1991, 3 Fed. Sent. R. 1991, pp. 276, 278.
2 Public Law 101-647, Sect. 1703 [104 Stat. 4846].
3FPSSIS, pronounced 'FIPSISS,' is an acronym for
"Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information
System," the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts'
automated information system for Federal sentencing.
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'

The FPSSIS and monitoring data are insufficiently
detailed to permit the fine-grained factual analyses of actual
offense behavior that are required to determine whether facts
alleged in specific cases might warrant filing of mandatorybearing charges. As a result, those data sources are used to
provide more general portraits of sentencing patterns over
time and in 1990. Among other things, they show that the
proportion of federal defendants sentenced for mandatorysentence offenses has been increasing steadily, that nominal
sentence lengths imposed are increasing substantially, and
that time-to-be-served is increasing even more rapidly. On
the last point: "A defendant receiving the median 36 month
term for drug distribution in 1984 would likely serve only
one-third of the sentence or 12 months. In 1990, a defendant
receiving the median 66 months for drug distribution would
likely serve 85 percent of the sentence or 56 months. Thus a
sentence increase of 83 percent actually results in an increase
of 367 percent in likely time served from 1984 to 1990." (P.
44)
' The report acknowledges that "prosecutors' reasons for
reducing or dismissing mandatory minimum provisions at
this stage cannot be assessed through this study" (p. 58) and
accordingly that some of these apparently "lenient" disposi-

tions may result from evidentiary or workload considerations.
6p. 53.
7 pp. ii, 76.
P. 53: ("The increased departure rate may reflect a
greater tendency to exercise prosecutorial or judicial
discretion as the severity of the penalties increases."). P. 58:
("The prosecutors' reasons for reducing or dismissing
mandatory [charges] ... may be attributable to ... satisfaction with the punishment received.").
Pp. ii-iii.
10
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